Coventry, Angela · 2008
Review P. J. E. Kail, Projection and Realism in Humes Philosophy
Coventry, Angela (2008). “Review P. J. E. Kail, Projection and Realism in Humes Philosophy.” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008(7).
10
citations of the Treatise
15
paragraphs reached
50%
focus on the core paragraphs
5.32
surprise of rarest citation
Focused on personal identity, and cites something almost nobody else does.
Theme mix
Self and the passions 0%Causation and the Appendix problem 100%Body and the external world 0%Immateriality of the soul 0%
Themes are fitted on citations outside 1.4.6 and the Appendix, which nearly every paper cites.
Its rarest citations
- T 1.3.11.3 3 other papers reach it
- T 1.3.11.1 3 other papers reach it
- T 1.3.11.2 3 other papers reach it
Nearest papers
- Cottrell 2015 similarity 0.81
Minds, Composition, and Humes Skepticism in the Appendix - Humber 1995 similarity 0.76
Humes Invisible Self - Nathanson 1976 similarity 0.68
Humes Second Thoughts on the Self - Garrett 2010 similarity 0.60
Once More Into the Labyrinth Kail’s Realist Explanation of Hume’s Second Thoughts About Personal Identity - Kail 2007 similarity 0.58
Projection and Realism in Humes Philosophy
Against the corpus
Where it cites the Treatise
Fewer citesmorenot citedone of the 15 core paragraphsfootnote
Book 1: Of the Understanding
Part 3: Of knowledge and probability
Part 4: Of the Sceptical and other systems of philosophy
Appendix
The evidence
Every citation the pipeline accepted, with the words around it. “Citation pattern” means a standard Norton or Selby-Bigge reference; “quote matched” means the quoted words were found in the Treatise at that page; “checked by model” means a language model judged an ambiguous page number to be a Treatise citation.
| Cited as | Maps to | Context |
|---|---|---|
| (125) Checked by model | T 1.3.11 (4 paragraphs) | … cannot be necessarily connected but the self is a bundle of causally related perceptions (125). Now as a causal re… |
| (145, 172) Checked by model | T 1.3.13.4 to T 1.3.14.36 (4 paragraphs) | …e thoughts possible by the attribution of features of experience to objects of experience (145, 172). This is the releva… |
| App.10 Citation pattern | App. 10 | …ther [knows] how to correct [his] former opinions, nor how to render them consistent" (T. App.10). [1] The two princ… |
| App.21 Citation pattern | App. 21 | …ng "simple and individual", or if the mind perceived "some real connexion among them" (T. App.21). Pleading "the pri… |
| App.21 Citation pattern | App. 21 | …ulty "absolutely insuperable" and seems pleased with his account of personal identity (T. App.21). Hume remarks that… |
| App.20 Citation pattern | App. 20 | …hat we only feel a connection between the distinct perceptions "need not surprize us" (T. App.20). The doctrine illu… |
| (124) Checked by model | T 1.3.11 (3 paragraphs) | …suggests on occasion that necessity is nothing but the internal determination of the mind (124). For example, when … |
| 1.4.7.5 Citation pattern | T 1.4.7.5 | … by custom, and causes us to make a transition from an object to its usual attendant" (T. 1.4.7.5). He even says that… |
| 1.3.14.24 Citation pattern | T 1.3.14.24 | …power and necessity, which are consequently qualities of perceptions, not of objects" (T. 1.3.14.24). This sort of caus… |
| App.20 Citation pattern | App. 20 | …e ideas of them are felt to be connected together and naturally introduce each other" (T. App.20). Causal anti-reali… |