T 1.3.11.5
SBN 125 · cited directly by 0 papers, reached by 3 more through page or section ranges
Since therefore an entire indifference is essential to chance, no one chance can possibly be superior to another, otherwise than as it is compos'd of a superior number of equal chances. For if we affirm that one chance can, after any other manner, be superior to another, we must at the same time affirm, that there is something, which gives it the superiority, and determines the event rather to that side than the other: That is, in other words, we must allow of a cause, and destroy the supposition of chance; which we had before establish'd. A perfect and total indifference is essential to chance, and one total indifference can never in itself be either superior or inferior to another. This truth is not peculiar to my system, but is acknowledg'd by every one, that forms calculations concerning chances.
Who cites it
0 of 3 papers cite this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.
| Paper | Cited as | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Coventry 2008 focused | (125) T 1.3.11 (4 paragraphs) Checked by model | … cannot be necessarily connected but the self is a bundle of causally related perceptions (125). Now as a causal re… |
| Pitson 2012 | T 1.3.2-14 T 1.3.2.1 to T 1.3.14.25 n32 (218 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ning of certain key philosophical ideas (for example, space and time, T 1.2.3; causation, T 1.3.2-14; the mind, T 1.4.5.… |
| Pitson 2013 | T 1.3.2-14 T 1.3.2.1 to T 1.3.14.25 n32 (218 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ain key philosophical ideas (for example, space and time (T 1.2.3; SBN 33-39), causation (T 1.3.2-14; SBN 73-172), the m… |