T 1.3.13.12
SBN 149-50 · cited directly by 0 papers, reached by 5 more through page or section ranges
Thus our general rules are in a manner set in opposition to each other. When an object appears, that resembles any |cause in very considerable circumstances, the imagination naturally carries us to a lively conception of the usual effect, tho' the object be different in the most material and most efficacious circumstances from that cause. Here is the first influence of general rules. But when we take a review of this act of the mind, and compare it with the more general and authentic operations of the understanding, we find it to be of an irregular nature, and destructive of all the most establish'd principles of reasonings; which is the cause of our rejecting it. This is a second influence of general rules, and implies the condemnation of the former. Sometimes the one, sometimes the other prevails, according to the disposition and character of the person. The vulgar are commonly guided by the first, and wise men by the second. Mean while the sceptics may here have the pleasure of observing a new and signal contradiction in our reason, and of seeing all philosophy ready to be subverted by a principle of human nature, and again sav'd by a new direction of the very same principle. The following of general rules is a very unphilosophical species of probability; and yet 'tis only by following them that we can correct this, and all other unphilosophical probabilities.
Who cites it
0 of 5 papers cite this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.
| Paper | Cited as | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Ainslie 1995 | (T 149-50) T 1.3.13 (5 paragraphs) Citation pattern | … imagination's propensity to extend a regularity beyond what we have actually experienced (T 149-50). In the case at han… |
| Loeb 2009 | (T pp. 149,150) T 1.3.13 (5 paragraphs) Citation pattern | … 4,104-5,175); in Liii.13, non-accidental regularities are more 'extensive' and 'general' (T pp. 149,150). This points in the… |
| Garral 2007 | (T 150, 173-76) T 1.3.13.12 to T 1.3.16.3 (18 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …492), or causal reasoning distills rules or norms by which to judge of causes and effects (T 150, 173-76) - so here, in Hume,… |
| Pitson 2012 | T 1.3.2-14 T 1.3.2.1 to T 1.3.14.25 n32 (218 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ning of certain key philosophical ideas (for example, space and time, T 1.2.3; causation, T 1.3.2-14; the mind, T 1.4.5.… |
| Pitson 2013 | SBN 150-51, 155-56 T 1.3.13.12 to T 1.3.14.3 (9 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …nto question our ability to arrive at secure conclusions in any context (EHU 12.5, 12.17; SBN 150-51, 155-56)-for example, by qu… |
| T 1.3.2-14 T 1.3.2.1 to T 1.3.14.25 n32 (218 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ain key philosophical ideas (for example, space and time (T 1.2.3; SBN 33-39), causation (T 1.3.2-14; SBN 73-172), the m… |