T 1.3.14.31
SBN 169-70 · cited directly by 7 papers, reached by 6 more through page or section ranges
There may two definitions be given of this relation, which |are only different, by their presenting a different view of the same object, and making us consider it either as a philosophical or as a natural relation; either as a comparison of two ideas, or as an association betwixt them. We may define a cause to be “An object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects resembling the former are plac'd in like relations of precedency and contiguity to those objects, that resemble the latter.” If this definition be esteem'd defective, because drawn from objects foreign to the cause, we may substitute this other definition in its place, viz. “A cause is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other.” Shou'd this definition also be rejected for the same reason, I know no other remedy, than that the persons, who express this delicacy, should substitute a juster definition in its place. But for my part I must own my incapacity for such an undertaking. When I examine with the utmost accuracy those objects, which are commonly denominated causes and effects, I find, in considering a single instance, that the one object is precedent and contiguous to the other; and in inlarging my view to consider several instances, I find only, that like objects are constantly plac'd in like relations of succession and contiguity. Again, when I consider the influence of this constant conjunction, I perceive, that such a relation can never be an object of reasoning, and can never operate upon the mind, but by means of custom, which determines the imagination to make a transition from the idea of one object to that of its usual attendant, and from the impression of one to a more lively idea of the other. However extraordinary these sentiments may appear, I think it fruitless to trouble myself with any farther enquiry or reasoning upon the subject, but shall repose myself on them as on establish'd maxims.
Who cites it
7 of 13 papers cite this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.
| Paper | Cited as | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Loeb 1992 | 1.3.14 T 1.3.14 (42 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ems content with the result that personal identity does not involve a real connection. At 1.3.14, "Of the idea of ne… |
| 1.3.14 T 1.3.14 (42 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ts this result with equanimity. This puzzle can be generalized somewhat. Hume observesin 1.3.14 that "the terms of … | |
| 1.3.14 T 1.3.14 (42 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …nnection in causation. Hume targets a number of the nearly synonymous notions not only in 1.3.14, but also at T 246-… | |
| 1.3.14 T 1.3.14 (42 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …in the appendix and in 1.4.6, and in the discussion of necessary connexion in 1.3.14.4 At 1.3.14, Hume argues that t… | |
| (T 170) T 1.3.14 (2 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …efinition in its place. But for my part I must own my incapacity for such an undertaking. (T 170) Hume introduces an… | |
| (T 170) T 1.3.14 (2 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …es that others might raise it. In the Treatise, Hume treats the objection as a "delicacy" (T 170). This suggests that… | |
| 1.3.14 T 1.3.14 (42 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …to a "real connexion" harken back to Hume's discussion of real connections at T 161-68 of 1.3.14, and to the objecti… | |
| 1.3.14 T 1.3.14 (42 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ed with reference to real connections, and real connections, as Hume conceives of them at 1.3.14, are intrinsic rela… | |
| (T 169) T 1.3.14 (4 paragraphs) Citation pattern | … for this reason; Hume has told us that he is defining "the relation of cause and effect" (T 169)-it is difficult to … | |
| 1.3.14 T 1.3.14 (42 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …extrinsic relations. He was clear that causation is extrinsic (T 169-70; E 76-77); and in 1.3.14 he intends to contr… | |
| Inukai 2007 focused | T 1.3.14.31 this paragraph Citation pattern | …atural relation; either as a comparison of two ideas, or as an association betwixt them" (T 1.3.14.31, SBN 169-170). 13. … |
| Loeb 2009 | (T p. 170) T 1.3.14 (2 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ion is strong. In the first place, Hume finds his two definitions of 'cause' 'defective' (T p. 170) or 'imperfect' (L. … |
| (T p. 170) T 1.3.14 (2 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …oke. Hume shrugs his shoulders; he challenges readers to 'substitute a juster definition' (T p. 170), and provides corre… | |
| I.iii.14 T 1.3.14 (42 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …juncture where projection, broadly construed, comes into play.) In the two definitions in I.iii.14 (T p. 169; cf. E p.… | |
| (T p. 170) T 1.3.14 (2 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …inely tailored explanations. For example, the causal analysis inherits the one 'delicacy' (T p. 170) or 'inconvenience' … | |
| Garrett 2010 | T 1.3.14.31 this paragraph Citation pattern | …like relations of precedency and contiguity to those objects, that resemble the latter." (T 1.3.14.31; SBN; SBN 170) 6 H… |
| SBN 170 T 1.3.14 (2 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …precedency and contiguity to those objects, that resemble the latter." (T 1.3.14.31; SBN; SBN 170) 6 He certainly do… | |
| Strawson 2011 | 1.3.14 T 1.3.14 (42 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …regularsuccession'or'constantconjunction 'and/or'feelingofdetermination'(forthedetails,see1.3.14oftheTreatise). Asfa… |
| 1.3.14.31 this paragraph Citation pattern | …ularsuccession,theseconddefinesitintermsofafeel ingofdeterminationinthemind(76-7/7.29,170/1.3.14.31,172/1.3.14.35).Bot … | |
| 1.3.14.31 this paragraph Citation pattern | …ey're'exact'and'precise'and'just',ora sjustasanydefinitionsofcausecanbe(169/1.3.14.30,170/1.3.14.31;compareE nquiry76/7… | |
| 1.3.14 T 1.3.14 (42 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …t hemind,notbelongtoit.' Inapposition,agroupofquotationsfromHume'sdiscussionofcausationin 1.3.14: 'thismultiplicity… | |
| 1.3.14.16-33 T 1.3.14 (18 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ofobjects,alongwiththedeterminationofthemind,whichco nstitutesaphysicalnecessity'.(163-71/1.3.14.16-33) Asregardsthefirstg… | |
| 1.3.14 T 1.3.14 (42 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ausalpowerwhoseexistencemanifestsitselfinconstantconjunctionhassuffere dthesametreatmentin1.3.14).Hehasonhisownterms… | |
| 1.3.14 T 1.3.14 (42 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …sanolessdeepandinflexibleprinciplegivenwhich [P8C]seriesofexperiencesofthekindspecifiedin1.3.14giverisetotheideaofo… | |
| 1.3.14 T 1.3.14 (42 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ctandunanswerable.Whenhemovedonfromhisempiricistaccountofthecontentof theideaofcausationin1.3.14oftheTreatise,andhis… | |
| 1.3.14 T 1.3.14 (42 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ichunitescausesandeffects, liesinthedeterminationofthemindtopassfromtheonetotheother'(166/1.3.14. 23;fordiscussionse… | |
| Cottrell 2015 | T 1.3.14.31 this paragraph Citation pattern | …constant conjunction among perceptions like them. Given Hume's first definition of cause (T 1.3.14.31; SBN 170), it follo… |
| T 1.3.14.31 this paragraph Citation pattern | … its usual attendant, and from the impression of one to a more lively idea of the other" (T 1.3.14.31; SBN 170). He expla… | |
| Rocknak 2019 | T 1.3.14 T 1.3.14 (42 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …oduct of a conditioning process (specifically, the repetitive association of impressions [T 1.3.14; SBN 15572]). In th… |
| T 1.3.14.31 this paragraph Citation pattern | …ine if two objects are causally related (T 1.1.5.1-2; SBN 13-14, T 1.3.6.1216; SBN 92-93, T 1.3.14.31; SBN 169-170). 21 … | |
| Waxman 1992 focused | Treatise I.3.14 T 1.3.14 (42 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …gh much of the Treatise, even in the account ofthe relation of cause and effect itself in Treatise I.3.14 On the other hand, … |
| Ellis 2006 focused | T 1.3.14 T 1.3.14 (42 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …duction Hume hoped in T 1.4.6 to do for the idea of the self what he had already done in T 1.3.14 and T 1.4.2 for the… |
| T 1.3.14 T 1.3.14 (42 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …similar form in the preceding paragraphs of the Appendix.) The second is his reasoning in T 1.3.14 from which he ultim… | |
| Winkler 2010 | Treatise 1.3.14 T 1.3.14 (42 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …at a short passage has "default referential force" is a bit like saying that the whole of Treatise 1.3.14, "Of the idea of ne… |
| Treatise 1.3.14 T 1.3.14 (42 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …nner of conceiving of a particular power in a particular body" comes, as it happens, from Treatise 1.3.14, which contains ano… | |
| Pitson 2012 | T 1.3.2-14 T 1.3.2.1 to T 1.3.14.25 n32 (218 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ning of certain key philosophical ideas (for example, space and time, T 1.2.3; causation, T 1.3.2-14; the mind, T 1.4.5.… |
| Strawson 2012 | THN 1.3.14 T 1.3.14 (42 paragraphs) Citation pattern | … - the PrincipleGoverned Mind described in THN 1.1.4 / 10-13 - with tremendous success in THN 1.3.14 / 155-72 ('Of the i… |
| 1.3.14 T 1.3.14 (42 paragraphs) Citation pattern | … THN 1.4.6 / 251-63 - after having devoted detailed attention to our idea of causation in 1.3.14 / 155-72, and our i… | |
| 1.3.14 T 1.3.14 (42 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …to deprive himself of 'the uniting principle' (THN 1.1.4.1 / 10) that he had relied on in 1.3.14 and 1.4.2: 'the pri… | |
| 1.3.14 T 1.3.14 (42 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …en he moved on from (3) his empiricist account of the content of the idea of causation in 1.3.14 / 155-72 of the Tre… | |
| Pitson 2013 | T 1.3.14.24-31 T 1.3.14 (8 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …o the impression of determination from which the idea of necessary connection is derived (T 1.3.14.24-31; SBN 166-70). It is… |
| T 1.3.2-14 T 1.3.2.1 to T 1.3.14.25 n32 (218 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ain key philosophical ideas (for example, space and time (T 1.2.3; SBN 33-39), causation (T 1.3.2-14; SBN 73-172), the m… |