T 1.3.11.8
SBN 127 · cited directly by 0 papers, reached by 2 more through page or section ranges
Shou'd it be said, that tho' in an opposition of chances 'tis impossible to determine with certainty, on which side the event will fall, yet we can pronounce with certainty, that 'tis more likely and probable, 'twill be on that side where there is a superior number of chances, than where there is an inferior: Shou'd this be said, I wou'd ask, what is here meant by likelihood and probability? The likelihood and probability of chances is a superior number of equal chances; and consequently when we say 'tis likely the event will fall on the side, which is superior, rather than on the inferior, we do no more than affirm, that where there is a superior number of chances there is actually a superior, and where there is an inferior there is an inferior; which are identical propositions, and of no consequence. The question is, by what means a superior number of equal chances operates upon the mind, and produces belief or assent; since it appears, that 'tis neither by arguments deriv'd from demonstration, nor from probability.
Who cites it
0 of 2 papers cite this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.
| Paper | Cited as | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Pitson 2012 | T 1.3.2-14 T 1.3.2.1 to T 1.3.14.25 n32 (218 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ning of certain key philosophical ideas (for example, space and time, T 1.2.3; causation, T 1.3.2-14; the mind, T 1.4.5.… |
| Pitson 2013 | T 1.3.2-14 T 1.3.2.1 to T 1.3.14.25 n32 (218 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ain key philosophical ideas (for example, space and time (T 1.2.3; SBN 33-39), causation (T 1.3.2-14; SBN 73-172), the m… |