Treatise Mapping
Map · Book 3: Of Morals · Part 1: Of Virtue and Vice in general · T 3.1.1 Moral Distinctions not deriv'd from Reason

T 3.1.1.9

SBN 458 · cited directly by 1 paper, reached by 1 more through page or section ranges

Reason is the discovery of truth or falshood. Truth or falshood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact. Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of this agreement or disagreement, is incapable of being true or false, and can never be an object of our reason. Now 'tis evident our passions, volitions, and actions, are not susceptible of any such agreement or disagreement; being original facts and realities, compleat in themselves, and implying no reference to other passions, volitions, and actions. 'Tis impossible, therefore, they can be pronounced either true or false, and be either contrary or conformable to reason.

Who cites it

1 of 2 papers cite this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.

PaperCited asContext
Cottrell 2015T 3.1.1.9
this paragraph
Citation pattern
…at the relevant sense of 'true' is "agreement . . . to real existence andmatter of fact" (T 3.1.1.9; SBN 458, italics i…
Ainslie 1999III.i.1
T 3.1.1 (30 paragraphs)
Citation pattern
…uments about moral judgement in the Section "Moral distinctions not deriv'd from reason" (III.i.1) take on a new ligh…