Map · Book 3: Of Morals · Part 1: Of Virtue and Vice in general · T 3.1.1 Moral Distinctions not deriv'd from Reason
T 3.1.1.8
SBN 457-8 · cited directly by 0 papers, reached by 1 more through page or section ranges
It would be tedious to repeat all the arguments, by which |I have prov'd,[67] that reason is perfectly inert, and can never either prevent or produce any action or affection. 'Twill be easy to recollect what has been said upon that subject. I shall only recal on this occasion one of these arguments, which I shall endeavour to render still more conclusive, and more applicable to the present subject.
Who cites it
0 of 1 paper cites this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.
| Paper | Cited as | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Ainslie 1999 | (T 457) T 3.1.1 (5 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …s direct. At any rate, Hume thinks that the moral sentiments are able to influence action (T 457), and thus they must… |
| III.i.1 T 3.1.1 (30 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …uments about moral judgement in the Section "Moral distinctions not deriv'd from reason" (III.i.1) take on a new ligh… |