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Map · Book 2: Of the Passions · Part 3: Of the will and direct passions · T 2.3.2 The same subject continu'd

T 2.3.2.2

SBN 408-9 · cited directly by 2 papers, reached by 2 more through page or section ranges

Secondly, there is a false sensation or experience even of the liberty of indifference; which is regarded as an argument for its real existence. The necessity of any action, whether of matter or of the mind, is not properly a quality in the agent, but in any thinking or intelligent being, who may consider the action, and consists in the determination of his thought to infer its existence from some preceding objects: As liberty or chance, on the other hand, is nothing but the want of that determination, and a certain looseness, which we feel in passing or not passing from the idea of one to that of the other. Now we may observe, that tho' in reflecting on human actions we seldom feel such a looseness or indifference, yet it very commonly happens, that in performing the actions themselves we are sensible of something like it: And as all related or resembling objects are readily taken for each other, this has been employ'd as a demonstrative or even an intuitive proof of human liberty. We feel that our actions are subject to our will on most occasions, and imagine we feel that the will itself is subject to nothing; because when by a denial of it we are provok'd to try, we feel that it moves easily every way, and produces an image of itself even on that side, on which it did not settle. This image or faint motion, we perswade ourselves, cou'd have been compleated into the thing itself; because, shou'd that be deny'd, we find, upon a second trial, that it can. But these efforts are all in vain; and whatever capricious and irregular actions we may perform; as the desire of showing our liberty is the sole motive of our actions; we can never free ourselves from the bonds of necessity. We may imagine we feel a liberty within ourselves; but a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character; and even where he cannot, he concludes in general, that he might, were he perfectly acquainted with |every circumstance of our situation and temper, and the most secret springs of our complexion and disposition. Now this is the very essence of necessity, according to the foregoing doctrine.

Who cites it

2 of 4 papers cite this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.

PaperCited asContext
Purviance 1997(T 408)
T 2.3.2 (2 paragraphs)
Citation pattern
…arantees a substantial self than the feeling of indifference proves that the will is free (T 408). When Hume turns to…
Mcintyre 2009T 2.3.2.5, 2
T 2.3.2 (2 paragraphs)
Citation pattern
…ed (at least sometimes) by the prospect of future pain or pleasure, punishment or reward (T 2.3.2.5, 2.3.3.3, 3.3.12). But…
Spector 19982.3.2
T 2.3.2 (8 paragraphs)
Citation pattern
….............69 2.3.1 Personality, Consciousness, and Moral Agency...................69 2.3.2 Recognizing One's O…
2.3.2
T 2.3.2 (8 paragraphs)
Citation pattern
…cke's Theory of Personal Identity: A Re-Examination" op. cit., p. 44. 68Ibid, p. 47. ## 2.3.2 Recognizing One's O…
Pitson 2013SBN 163, 165, 403, 409
T 1.3.14.16 to T 2.3.2.4 (12 paragraphs)
Citation pattern
…time (T 1.2.2.4; SBN 31); power and necessity (T 1.3.14.16, 1.3.14.22, 2.3.1.10, 2.3.2.2; SBN 163, 165, 403, 409); belief (T 1.4.2.2…