T 1.2.4.32
SBN 52 · cited directly by 5 papers, reached by 1 more through page or section ranges
This may open our eyes a little, and let us see, that no geometrical demonstration for the infinite divisibility of extension can have so much force as what we naturally attribute to every argument, which is supported by such magnificent pretensions. At the same time we may learn the reason, why geometry fails of evidence in this single point, while all its other reasonings command our fullest assent and approbation. And indeed it seems more requisite to give the reason of this exception, than to shew, that we really must make such an exception, and regard all the mathematical arguments for infinite divisibility as utterly sophistical. For 'tis evident, that as no idea of quantity is infinitely divisible, there cannot be imagin'd a more glaring absurdity, than to endeavour to prove, that quantity itself admits of such a division; and to prove this by means of ideas, which are directly opposite in that particular. And as this absurdity is very glaring in itself, so there is no argument founded on it, which is not attended with a new absurdity, and involves not an evident contradiction.
Who cites it
5 of 6 papers cite this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.
| Paper | Cited as | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Spector 1998 | 2.2.1.
52 T 1.2.4 (2 paragraphs) Citation pattern | … Hume. See 3.3.1 note, for more on property and Hume's account of personal identity. 51In 2.2.1. 52whether "forensick" … |
| THN 1.2.4.32 this paragraph Citation pattern | …ty of ideas in Book I, including: space (1.2.3.1, p. 33), time (1.2.3.6, p. 34), vacuum, (THN 1.2.4.32, p. 53), existence … | |
| Falkenstein 1999 | (52) T 1.2.4 (2 paragraphs) Checked by model | …se external objects to have features incompatible with those exhibited by our impressions (52). The fact that all … |
| Mcintyre 2009 | T 1.4.2.51-2 T 1.2.4 (3 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …up the opinion that resembling impressions are interrupted and different from each other (T 1.4.2.51-2). This leads to the… |
| Rocknak 2012 focused | T 1.4.2.52 T 1.2.4 (2 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ses all of our perceptions (distinct existences), as the philosophers mistakenly do (e.g. T 1.4.2.52; SBN 214-15; recall… |
| Rocknak 2019 | T 1.4.2.52 T 1.2.4 (2 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ophical conception of objects is the "monstrous offspring" of reason and the imagination (T 1.4.2.52; SBN 215). Hume's … |
| T 1.4.2.43-53 T 1.2.4.10 to T 1.2.5.1 (26 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …to the senses," where he discusses the philosopher's rejection of the vulgar perspective (T 1.4.2.43-53; SBN 209-16). Hume'… | |
| Cottrell 2015 | T 1.4.2.46 - 55 T 1.2.4.20 to T 1.2.5.5 (19 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …uses of our sensory impressions and attributes the defining properties of a body to them (T 1.4.2.46 - 55; SBN 211 - 17). He … |