T 1.2.4.10
SBN 42-3 · cited directly by 0 papers, reached by 3 more through page or section ranges
Two different answers, I find, have been made to this argument; neither of which is in my opinion satisfactory. The first is, that the objects of geometry, those surfaces, lines and points, whose proportions and positions it examines, are mere ideas in the mind; and not only never did, but never can exist in nature. They never did exist; for no one will pretend to draw a line or make a surface entirely |conformable to the definition: They never can exist; for we may produce demonstrations from these very ideas to prove, that they are impossible.
Who cites it
0 of 3 papers cite this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.
| Paper | Cited as | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Spector 1998 | THN 1.4.2.42 T 1.2.4 (4 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …osition of the continued existence of perceptions and objects is a "fallacy" and "error" (THN 1.4.2.42, p. 210). 36THN 1.… |
| Swain 2006 focused | T 1.4.2.43 T 1.2.4 (6 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …he distinctness of the distinct objects of perception, which is the case with the vulgar (T 1.4.2.43; SBN 209), or they … |
| Rocknak 2019 | T 1.4.2.43-53 T 1.2.4.10 to T 1.2.5.1 (26 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …to the senses," where he discusses the philosopher's rejection of the vulgar perspective (T 1.4.2.43-53; SBN 209-16). Hume'… |