Yang, Xiaomei · 1998
Humes View on Personal Identity Scepticism or Nonscepticism?
Yang, Xiaomei (1998). “Humes View on Personal Identity Scepticism or Nonscepticism?.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 15(1): 37–56.
24
citations of the Treatise
45
paragraphs reached
41%
focus on the core paragraphs
4.45
surprise of rarest citation
Focused on personal identity, and cites something almost nobody else does.
Theme mix
Self and the passions 0%Causation and the Appendix problem 0%Body and the external world 93%Immateriality of the soul 8%
Themes are fitted on citations outside 1.4.6 and the Appendix, which nearly every paper cites.
Its rarest citations
- T 1.4.2.29 n37 21 other papers reach it
- T 1.4.2.27 21 other papers reach it
- T 1.4.2.25 21 other papers reach it
Nearest papers
- Patten 1976 similarity 0.99
Humes Bundles, Self-Consciousness and Kant - Rocknak 2012 similarity 0.99
Imagined Causes Humes Conception of Objects - Penelhum 2000 similarity 0.94
Themes in Hume The Self, the Will, Religion - Giles 1993 similarity 0.93
The No-Self Theory Hume, Buddhism, and Personal Identity - Roth 1990 similarity 0.93
Hume and James on Personal Identity
Against the corpus
Where it cites the Treatise
Fewer citesmorenot citedone of the 15 core paragraphsfootnote
Book 1: Of the Understanding
Part 4: Of the Sceptical and other systems of philosophy
Appendix
The evidence
Every citation the pipeline accepted, with the words around it. “Citation pattern” means a standard Norton or Selby-Bigge reference; “quote matched” means the quoted words were found in the Treatise at that page; “checked by model” means a language model judged an ambiguous page number to be a Treatise citation.
| Cited as | Maps to | Context |
|---|---|---|
| " (256) Quote matched to the Treatise | T 1.4.6 (3 paragraphs) | …ust be the uninterrupted progress of the thought, which constitutes the imperfect identity" (256).7 A & S obvious… |
| " (254) Quote matched to the Treatise | T 1.4.6 (2 paragraphs) | …feign the continued existence of the perceptions of our senses, to remove the interruption" (254). What does Hume re… |
| " (256) Quote matched to the Treatise | T 1.4.6 (3 paragraphs) | …ition, and are apt to imagine, that 'tis nothing but a continued survey of the same object" (256). If there are no un… |
| (259) Quote matched to the Treatise | T 1.4.6 (2 paragraphs) | …tious one, and of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetables and animal bodies. (259) - (2) I cannot comp… |
| (261) Quote matched to the Treatise | T 1.4.6 (3 paragraphs) | …acter and disposition, as well as his impressions and ideas, without losing his identity. (261) It is implausible … |
| " (255) Quote matched to the Treatise | T 1.4.6 (3 paragraphs) | …sist of a succession of parts, connected together by resemblance, contiguity, or causation" (255). Identity in the st… |
| (259-260) Quote matched to the Treatise | T 1.4.6 (4 paragraphs) | … them, because of the union of their ideas in the imagination, when we reflect upon them. (259-260) Hence, the convent… |
| " (258) Quote matched to the Treatise | T 1.4.6 (2 paragraphs) | …orrectly call it the same as the original one "without breach of the propriety of language" (258), if its suc cessive… |
| " (258) Quote matched to the Treatise | T 1.4.6 (2 paragraphs) | …itants of the parish; and yet this alone is sufficient to make us denominate them the same" (258). By the same reason… |
| (253) Quote matched to the Treatise | T 1.4.6 (3 paragraphs) | …s perfect a notion of diversity, as if there was no manner of relation among the objects. (253) This passage clear… |
| " (200) Checked by model | T 1.4.2 (6 paragraphs) | … unity and number there can be no medium; no more than between existence and nonexistence" (200). The argumentation… |
| " (258) Quote matched to the Treatise | T 1.4.6 (2 paragraphs) | …ds have only a specific identity or resemblance, and there is nothing numerically the same" (258). The point Hume mak… |
| " (252) Quote matched to the Treatise | T 1.4.6 (3 paragraphs) | …of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions. ..." (252) - (P2) Nothing real… |
| " (255) Quote matched to the Treatise | T 1.4.6 (3 paragraphs) | …ently to our no tion of diversity, it can only be by mistake we ascribe to it an identity." (255) This argument will… |
| (251) Checked by model | T 1.4.5.35 to T 1.4.6.2 (3 paragraphs) | … claim in the section Of Personal Identity. The argument from reductionism is as follows (251): 1. Every idea has… |
| (252) Quote matched to the Treatise | T 1.4.6 (3 paragraphs) | …nks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. (252) This reductionist … |
| (635) Quote matched to the Treatise | Appendix (5 paragraphs) | … the ideas of them are felt to be connected together, and naturally introduce each other. (635) The idea Hume expr… |
| (200) Checked by model | T 1.4.2 (6 paragraphs) | …nt of personal identity is sceptical. The following argument is Hume's sceptical argument (200): - (PI) A single o… |
| (188-189) Checked by model | T 1.4.2 (6 paragraphs) | …y, that is, there are no continued existences, or exist ences independent of perceptions. (188-189) Cl implies a scept… |
| " (197) Quote matched to the Treatise | T 1.4.2 (2 paragraphs) | …n for us to infer a greater degree of regularity in some objects, which are not per ceived" (197). To infer a continu… |
| (198) Checked by model | T 1.4.2 (4 paragraphs) | …erved. This commits us to a false belief that this table has a real identity through time (198). In another passage… |
| (199) Checked by model | T 1.4.2 (3 paragraphs) | … the same sun we saw yesterday, because of the resemblance. But they really are different (199). These passages cle… |
| " (259) Quote matched to the Treatise | T 1.4.6 (2 paragraphs) | …itious one, and of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetables and animal bodies" (259). One possible doub… |
| (636) Checked by model | Appendix (3 paragraphs) | … other claims that the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences (636). The puzzle is that… |