T 3.3.4.2
SBN 607-8 · cited directly by 2 papers, reached by 1 more through page or section ranges
Tho' we refuse to natural abilities the title of virtues, we must allow, that they procure the love and esteem of mankind; that they give a new lustre to the other virtues; and that a man possess'd of them is much more intitled to our good-will and services, than one entirely void of them. It may, indeed, be pretended, that the sentiment of approbation, which those qualities produce, besides its being inferior, is also somewhat different from that, which attends the other virtues. But this, in my opinion, is not a sufficient reason for excluding them from the catalogue of virtues. Each of the virtues, even benevolence, justice, gratitude, integrity, excites a different sentiment or feeling in the spectator. The characters of Cæsar and Cato, as drawn by Sallust, are both of them virtuous, in the strictest sense of the word; but in a different way: Nor are the sentiments entirely the same, which arise from them. The one produces love; the other |esteem: The one is amiable; the other awful: We cou'd wish to meet with the one character in a friend; the other character we wou'd be ambitious of in ourselves. In like manner, the approbation, which attends natural abilities, may be somewhat different to the feeling from that, which arises from the other virtues, without making them entirely of a different species. And indeed we may observe, that the natural abilities, no more than the other virtues, produce not, all of them, the same kind of approbation. Good sense and genius beget esteem: Wit and humour excite love[88].
Who cites it
2 of 3 papers cite this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.
| Paper | Cited as | Context |
|---|---|---|
| GalIagher 1992 | ". (608) T 3.3.4 (3 paragraphs) Quote matched to the Treatise | …s "almost impossible for the mind to change its character in any considerable article .. .". (608). - 12 Also see Writ… |
| Garral 2007 | (T 606-614) T 3.3.3.8 to T 3.3.5.2 (19 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …alent and virtue elicit more or less the same sympathetic moral feelings in the spectator (T 606-614); second, that there… |
| (T 608) T 3.3.4 (3 paragraphs) Citation pattern | … Hume doesn't do). Aspectator's pleasurable response to the former pair may not vary much (T 608), but presumably her… | |
| Greco 2015 | T 3.3.4-5 T 3.3.4.1 to T 3.3.5.6 (21 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …n Book 3 of the Treatise and in the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals (see esp. T 3.3.4-5; EPM 6-8), one clea… |