T 3.3.1.23
SBN 586-7 · cited directly by 1 paper, reached by 2 more through page or section ranges
Upon these principles we may easily remove any contradiction, which may appear to be betwixt the extensive sympathy, on which our sentiments of virtue depend, and that limited generosity which I have frequently observ'd to be natural to men, and which justice and property suppose, according to the precedent reasoning. My sympathy with another may give me the sentiment of pain and disapprobation, when any object is presented, that has a tendency to give him uneasiness; tho' I may not be willing to sacrifice any thing of my own interest, or cross any of my passions, for his satisfaction. A house may displease me by being ill-contriv'd for the convenience of the owner; and yet I may refuse to give a shilling towards the rebuilding of it. Sentiments must touch the heart, to make them controul our passions: But they need not extend beyond the imagination, to make them influence our taste. When a building seems clumsy and tottering to the eye, it is ugly and disagreeable; tho' we be fully assur'd of the solidity of the workmanship. 'Tis a kind of fear, which causes this sentiment of disapprobation; but the passion is not the same with that which we feel, when oblig'd to stand under a wall, that we really think tottering and insecure. The seeming tendencies of objects affect the mind: And the emotions they excite are of a like species with those, which proceed from the real consequences of objects, but their feeling is different. Nay, these emotions are so different in their feeling that they may often be contrary, without destroying each other; as when the fortifications of a city belonging to an enemy are esteem'd beautiful |upon account of their strength, tho' we cou'd wish that they were entirely destroy'd. The imagination adheres to the general views of things, and distinguishes the feelings they produce, frombetwixt the feelings they produce, and those which arise from our particular and momentary situation.
Who cites it
1 of 3 papers cite this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.
| Paper | Cited as | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Ainslie 1999 | (T 586) T 3.3.1 (2 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …nevolence or anger [II.ii.6, T 382, etc.]), the moral sentiments need not move one to act (T 586) ("/krdal," 292 ). B… |
| Spector 1998 | 3.3.1 T 3.3.1 (32 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 3.3.1 The Fiction of Self… |
| 3.3.1 T 3.3.1 (32 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …vol. i, and it remained a standard thought experiment through the eighteenth century. See 3.3.1, for more on the Sh… | |
| 3.3.1 T 3.3.1 (32 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …about rights, justice and even personal identity, as we see with both Locke and Hume. See 3.3.1 note, for more on p… | |
| 3.3.1 T 3.3.1 (32 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ror made in the supposition of bodily continuity. ## 3.3 The Epistemological Problem ## 3.3.1 The Fiction of Self… | |
| 3.3.1 T 3.3.1 (32 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …. 252. !8l am grateful to Candace Vogler for prompting me to clarify the difference. See 3.3.1 for a discussion of… | |
| Ainslie 2003 | T 3.3.1 T 3.3.1 (32 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …es - qualities useful or agreeable to the trait's possessor or to those who surround her (T 3.3.1) - offer little hel… |