T 3.3.1.18
SBN 583-4 · cited directly by 0 papers, reached by 3 more through page or section ranges
But however the general principle of our blame or praise may be corrected by those other principles, 'tis certain, they are not altogether efficacious, nor do our passions often correspond entirely to the present theory. 'Tis seldom men heartily love what lies at a distance from them, and what no way redounds to their particular benefit; as 'tis no less rare to meet with persons, who can pardon another any opposition he makes to their interest, however justifiable that opposition may be by the general rules of morality. Here we are contented with saying, that reason requires such an impartial conduct, but that 'tis seldom we can bring ourselves to it, and that our passions do not readily follow the determination of our judgment. This language will be easily understood, if we consider what we formerly said concerning that reason, which is able to oppose our passion; and which we have found to be nothing but a general calm determination of the passions, founded on some distant view or reflection. When we form our judgments of persons, merely from the tendency of their characters to our own benefit, or to that of our friends, we find so many contradictions to our sentiments in society and conversation, and such an uncertainty from the incessant changes of our situation, that we seek some other standard of merit and demerit, which may not admit of so great variation. Being thus loosen'd from our first station, we cannot afterwards fix ourselves so commodiously by any means as by a sympathy with those, who have any commerce with the person we consider. This is far from being as lively as when our own interest is concern'd, or that of our particular friends; nor |has it such an influence on our love and hatred: But being equally conformable to our calm and general principles, 'tis said to have an equal authority over our reason, and to command our judgment and opinion. We blame equally a bad action, which we read of in history, with one perform'd in our neighbourhood t'other day: The meaning of which is, that we know from reflection, that the former action wou'd excite as strong sentiments of disapprobation as the latter, were it plac'd in the same position.
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0 of 3 papers cite this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.
| Paper | Cited as | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Spector 1998 | 3.3.1 T 3.3.1 (32 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 3.3.1 The Fiction of Self… |
| 3.3.1 T 3.3.1 (32 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …vol. i, and it remained a standard thought experiment through the eighteenth century. See 3.3.1, for more on the Sh… | |
| 3.3.1 T 3.3.1 (32 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …about rights, justice and even personal identity, as we see with both Locke and Hume. See 3.3.1 note, for more on p… | |
| 3.3.1 T 3.3.1 (32 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ror made in the supposition of bodily continuity. ## 3.3 The Epistemological Problem ## 3.3.1 The Fiction of Self… | |
| 3.3.1 T 3.3.1 (32 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …. 252. !8l am grateful to Candace Vogler for prompting me to clarify the difference. See 3.3.1 for a discussion of… | |
| Ainslie 1999 | (T 575, 581, 582, 584, 592) T 3.3.1.3 to T 3.3.2.2 (14 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ntal qualities" (T 574, 575, 577, 578, 579, 58a, 587, 59 ~ 591, 598, 6o6, 618), "persons" (T 575, 581, 582, 584, 592), "acUons" (T 471, 4… |
| Ainslie 2003 | T 3.3.1 T 3.3.1 (32 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …es - qualities useful or agreeable to the trait's possessor or to those who surround her (T 3.3.1) - offer little hel… |