T 3.3.1.15
SBN 581-2 · cited directly by 3 papers, reached by 3 more through page or section ranges
To this I answer: The approbation of moral qualities most certainly is not deriv'd from reason, or any comparison of ideas; but proceeds entirely from a moral taste, and from certain sentiments of pleasure or disgust, which arise upon the contemplation and view of particular qualities or characters. Now 'tis evident, that those sentiments, whence-ever they are deriv'd, must vary according to the distance or contiguity of the objects; nor can I feel the same lively pleasure from the virtues of a person, who liv'd in Greece two thousand years ago, that I feel from the virtues of a familiar friend and acquaintance. Yet I do not say, that I esteem the one more than the other: And therefore, if the variation of the sentiment, without a variation of the esteem, be an objection, it must have equal force against every other system, as against that of sympathy. But to consider the mattercase a-right, it has no force at all; and 'tis the easiest matter in the world to account for it. Our situation, with regard both to persons and things, is in continual fluctuation; and a man, that lies at a distance from us, may, in a little time, become a familiar acquaintance. Besides, every particular man has a peculiar position with regard to others; and 'tis impossible we cou'd ever converse together on any reasonable terms, were each of us to consider characters and persons, only as they appear from his peculiar point of view. In order, therefore, to prevent those continual contradictions, and arrive at a more stable judgment of things, we fix on some steady and general |points of view; and always, in our thoughts, place ourselves in them, whatever may be our present situation. In like manner, external beauty is determin'd merely by pleasure; and 'tis evident, a beautiful countenance cannot give so much pleasure, when seen at the distance of twenty paces, as when it is brought nearer us. We say not, however, that it appears to us less beautiful: Because we know what effect it will have in such a position, and by that reflection we correct its momentary appearance.
Who cites it
3 of 6 papers cite this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.
| Paper | Cited as | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Ainslie 1995 | (T 580-81) T 3.3.1 (4 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …icated passions are more strongly felt the stronger the relation between the communicants (T 580-81). Note that Hume's … |
| (T 582) T 3.3.1 (3 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …at is, we view the relevant person's character for justice from a "general point of view" (T 582).10 If our society i… | |
| (T 581) T 3.3.1 (2 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …Hume requires that we correct for the difference in the ease of sympathetic communication (T 581). This does not, how… | |
| Ainslie 1999 | (T 575, 581, 582, 584, 592) T 3.3.1.3 to T 3.3.2.2 (14 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ntal qualities" (T 574, 575, 577, 578, 579, 58a, 587, 59 ~ 591, 598, 6o6, 618), "persons" (T 575, 581, 582, 584, 592), "acUons" (T 471, 4… |
| (T 581-582) T 3.3.1 (4 paragraphs) Citation pattern | … I I in orde r to cor rec t for this di s tor t ion of our sympa t he t i c t endenc i es (T 581-582) . Given tha t Hume… | |
| Ainslie 2003 | T 3.3.1.15 this paragraph Citation pattern | …for distortions brought on by our distance from the person whose trait we are evaluating (T 3.3.1.15, SBN 581-2). And he… |
| T 3.3.1 T 3.3.1 (32 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …es - qualities useful or agreeable to the trait's possessor or to those who surround her (T 3.3.1) - offer little hel… | |
| Loeb 2009 | (T pp. 581-2) T 3.3.1 (4 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …uncorrected, sympathy-driven evaluation, we 'fix' on a 'steady and general' point of view (T pp. 581-2). The perspective of… |
| Greco 2015 | T 3.3.1.15-16 T 3.3.1 (2 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …N 581) pronouncing from the "steady and general," or "common," point of view of morality (T 3.3.1.15-16 and 30/SBN 581-82 a… |
| SBN 581-82 T 3.3.1 (4 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …om the "steady and general," or "common," point of view of morality (T 3.3.1.15-16 and 30/SBN 581-82 and 591), we develo… | |
| Spector 1998 | 3.3.1 T 3.3.1 (32 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 3.3.1 The Fiction of Self… |
| 3.3.1 T 3.3.1 (32 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …vol. i, and it remained a standard thought experiment through the eighteenth century. See 3.3.1, for more on the Sh… | |
| 3.3.1 T 3.3.1 (32 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …about rights, justice and even personal identity, as we see with both Locke and Hume. See 3.3.1 note, for more on p… | |
| 3.3.1 T 3.3.1 (32 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ror made in the supposition of bodily continuity. ## 3.3 The Epistemological Problem ## 3.3.1 The Fiction of Self… | |
| 3.3.1 T 3.3.1 (32 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …. 252. !8l am grateful to Candace Vogler for prompting me to clarify the difference. See 3.3.1 for a discussion of… |