T 3.3.1.11
SBN 578-9 · cited directly by 1 paper, reached by 2 more through page or section ranges
That many of the natural virtues have this tendency to the good of society, no one can doubt of. Meekness, beneficence, charity, generosity, clemency, moderation, equity, bear the greatest figure among the moral qualities, and are commonly denominated the social virtues, to mark their tendency to the good of society. This goes so far, that some philosophers have represented all moral distinctions as the effect of artifice and education, when skilful politicians endeavour'd to restrain the turbulent passions of men, and make them operate to the public good, by the notions of honour and shame. This system, however, is not consistent with experience. For, first, there are other virtues and vices beside those which |have this tendency to the public advantage and loss. Secondly, had not men a natural sentiment of approbation and blame, it cou'd never be excited by politicians; nor wou'd the words laudable and praise-worthy, blameable and odious, be any more intelligible, than if they were a language perfectly unknown to us, as we have already observ'd. But tho' this system be erroneous, it may teach us, that moral distinctions arise, in a great measure, from the tendency of qualities and characters to the interestsinterest of society, and that 'tis our concern for that interest, which makes us approve or disapprove of them. Now we have no such extensive concern for society but from sympathy; and consequently 'tis that principle, which takes us so far out of ourselves, as to give us the same pleasure or uneasiness in the characters of others which are useful or pernicious to society as if they had a tendency to our own advantage or loss.
Who cites it
1 of 3 papers cite this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.
| Paper | Cited as | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Rocknak 2012 focused | " (p. 578) T 3.3.1 (2 paragraphs) Checked by model | … ourselves, according to Hume? For "we cannot re fl ect on all our perceptions at one time" (p. 578), particularly, we c… |
| Spector 1998 | 3.3.1 T 3.3.1 (32 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 3.3.1 The Fiction of Self… |
| 3.3.1 T 3.3.1 (32 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …vol. i, and it remained a standard thought experiment through the eighteenth century. See 3.3.1, for more on the Sh… | |
| 3.3.1 T 3.3.1 (32 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …about rights, justice and even personal identity, as we see with both Locke and Hume. See 3.3.1 note, for more on p… | |
| 3.3.1 T 3.3.1 (32 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ror made in the supposition of bodily continuity. ## 3.3 The Epistemological Problem ## 3.3.1 The Fiction of Self… | |
| 3.3.1 T 3.3.1 (32 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …. 252. !8l am grateful to Candace Vogler for prompting me to clarify the difference. See 3.3.1 for a discussion of… | |
| Ainslie 2003 | T 3.3.1 T 3.3.1 (32 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …es - qualities useful or agreeable to the trait's possessor or to those who surround her (T 3.3.1) - offer little hel… |