Map · Book 3: Of Morals · Part 2: Of justice and injustice · T 3.2.6 Some farther reflections concerning justice and injustice
T 3.2.6.2
SBN 526-7 · cited directly by 1 paper
I. The first argument I shall make use of is deriv'd from the vulgar definition of justice. Justice is commonly defin'd to be a constant and perpetual will of giving every one his due. In this definition 'tis supposed, that there are such things as right and property, independent of justice, and antecedent to it; and that they wou'd have subsisted, tho' men had never |dreamt of practising such a virtue. I have already observ'd, in a cursory manner, the fallacy of this opinion, and shall here continue to open up a little more distinctly my sentiments on that subject.
Who cites it
1 of 1 paper cites this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.
| Paper | Cited as | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Ainslie 1995 | (T 484, 526) T 3.2.1.18 to T 3.2.6.2 (6 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …eniences in the strictness of the idea of property contained in the first "law of nature" (T 484, 526) are recognized, the… |
| (T 526) T 3.2.6 (2 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …igation of promises. These artifices, too, are nothing but "more artful and refin'd ways" (T 526) of satisfying natur… |