Map · Book 3: Of Morals · Part 2: Of justice and injustice · T 3.2.5 Of the obligation of promises
T 3.2.5.5
SBN 518 · cited directly by 1 paper
But, secondly, if there was any act of the mind belonging to it, it could not naturally produce any obligation. This appears evidently from the foregoing reasoning. A promise creates a new obligation. A new obligation supposes new sentiments to arise. The will never creates new sentiments. There could not naturally, therefore, arise any obligation from a promise, even supposing the mind could fall into the absurdity of willing that obligation.
Who cites it
1 of 1 paper cites this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.
| Paper | Cited as | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Garral 2007 | (T 518) T 3.2.5 (3 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …fulfill her promise she must have "no motive" to doing so "distinct from a sense of duty" (T 518). Thus she must not … |
| (T 478, 518) T 3.2.1.3 to T 3.2.5.4 n77 (7 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …children), a parent's obligations are rooted in her being "bound by the laws of humanity" (T 478, 518). Moreover, these ar… |