T 3.2.2.8
SBN 488-9 · cited directly by 1 paper, reached by 1 more through page or section ranges
In vain shou'd we expect to find, in uncultivated nature, a remedy to this inconvenience; or hope for any inartificial principle of the human mind, which might controul those partial affections, and make us overcome the temptations arising from our circumstances. The idea of justice can never serve to this purpose, or be taken for a natural principle, capable of inspiring men with an equitable conduct towards each other. That virtue, as it is now understood, wou'd never have been dream'd of among rude and savage men. For the notion of injury or injustice implies an immorality or vice committed against some other person: And as every immorality is deriv'd from some defect or unsoundness of the passions, and as this defect must be judg'd of, in a great measure, from the ordinary course of nature in the constitution of the mind; 'twill be easy to know, whether we be guilty of any immorality, with regard to others, by considering the natural, and usual force of those several affections, which are directed towards them. Now it appears, that in the original frame of our mind, our strongest attention is confin'd to ourselves; our next is extended to our relations and acquaintance; and 'tis only the weakest which reaches to strangers and indifferent persons. This partiality, then, and unequal affection, must not only have an influence on our behaviour and conduct in society, but even on our ideas of vice and virtue; so as to make us regard any remarkable transgression of such a degree of partiality, either by too great an enlargement, or contraction of the affections, as vicious and immoral. This we may observe in our common judgments concerning actions, where we blame a person, who either centers all his affections in his family, or |is so regardless of them, as, in any opposition of interest, to give the preference to a stranger, or mere chance acquaintance. From all which it follows, that our natural uncultivated ideas of morality, instead of providing a remedy for the partiality of our affections, do rather conform themselves to that partiality, and give it an additional force and influence.
Who cites it
1 of 2 papers cite this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.
| Paper | Cited as | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Ainslie 1995 | (T 489) T 3.2.2 (2 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …fied when constrained by the artifice of property than they are without such a constraint (T 489); the interested "pa… |
| Spector 1998 | 3.2.2 T 3.2.2 (28 paragraphs) Citation pattern | … 3.2.1 Book I's Conceptual Empiricism.............................................. 101 3.2.2 Bodily Continuity..… |
| 3.2.2 T 3.2.2 (28 paragraphs) Citation pattern | … ·Chapter Four discusses the developmental aspects of Hume's account of the passions. ## 3.2.2 Bodily Continuity … | |
| 3.2.2 T 3.2.2 (28 paragraphs) Citation pattern | … into our passions and emotions; none of which can possibly represent a substance." ^See 3.2.2 note. Hume begins … | |
| 3.2.2 T 3.2.2 (28 paragraphs) Citation pattern | … rather than experience. 73THN 1.4.1.12, p. 187. 74THN 1.4.2.1, p. 187. 75As we saw in 3.2.2, early signs of Hum… | |
| 3.2.2 T 3.2.2 (28 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …nd-up, but in his account of bodily continuity, he does take a step away from atomism, as 3.2.2 showed. *Hume says… | |
| 3.2.2 T 3.2.2 (28 paragraphs) Citation pattern | … in his struggle with the issue of personal identity with regard to thought. As we saw in 3.2.2, that question only… |