T 3.2.2.16
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This, no doubt, is to be regarded as an idle fiction; but yet deserves our attention, because nothing can more evidently shew the origin of those virtues, which are the subjects of our present enquiry. I have already observ'd, that justice takes its rise from human conventions; and that these are intended as a remedy to some inconveniences, which proceed from the concurrence of certain qualities of the human mind with the situation of external objects. The qualities of the mind are selfishness and limited generosity: And the situation of external objects is their easy change, join'd to their scarcity in comparison of the wants and desires of men. But however philosophers may have been bewilder'd in those speculations, poets have been guided more infallibly, by a certain taste or common instinct, which in most kinds of reasoning goes farther than any of that art and philosophy, with which we have been yet acquainted. They easily perceiv'd, if every man had a tender regard for another, or if nature supplied abundantly all our wants and desires, that the jealousy of interest, which justice supposes, could no longer have place; nor would there be any occasion for those distinctions and limits of property and possession, which at present are in use among mankind. Encrease to a sufficient degree the bene|volence of men, or the bounty of nature, and you render justice useless, by supplying its place with much nobler virtues, and more valuable blessings. The selfishness of men is animated by the few possessions we have, in proportion to our wants; and 'tis to restrain this selfishness, that men have been oblig'd to separate themselves from the community, and to distinguish betwixt their own goods and those of others.
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| Spector 1998 | 3.2.2 T 3.2.2 (28 paragraphs) Citation pattern | … 3.2.1 Book I's Conceptual Empiricism.............................................. 101 3.2.2 Bodily Continuity..… |
| 3.2.2 T 3.2.2 (28 paragraphs) Citation pattern | … ·Chapter Four discusses the developmental aspects of Hume's account of the passions. ## 3.2.2 Bodily Continuity … | |
| 3.2.2 T 3.2.2 (28 paragraphs) Citation pattern | … into our passions and emotions; none of which can possibly represent a substance." ^See 3.2.2 note. Hume begins … | |
| 3.2.2 T 3.2.2 (28 paragraphs) Citation pattern | … rather than experience. 73THN 1.4.1.12, p. 187. 74THN 1.4.2.1, p. 187. 75As we saw in 3.2.2, early signs of Hum… | |
| 3.2.2 T 3.2.2 (28 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …nd-up, but in his account of bodily continuity, he does take a step away from atomism, as 3.2.2 showed. *Hume says… | |
| 3.2.2 T 3.2.2 (28 paragraphs) Citation pattern | … in his struggle with the issue of personal identity with regard to thought. As we saw in 3.2.2, that question only… |