Treatise Mapping
Map · Book 3: Of Morals · Part 2: Of justice and injustice · T 3.2.2 Of the origin of justice and property

T 3.2.2.14

SBN 492-3 · cited directly by 2 papers, reached by 1 more through page or section ranges

Now as 'tis by establishing the rule for the stability of |possession, that this passion restrains itself; if that rule be very abstruse, and of difficult invention; society must be esteem'd, in a manner, accidental, and the effect of many ages. But if it be found, that nothing can be more simple and obvious than that rule; that every parent, in order to preserve peace among his children, must establish it; and that these first rudiments of justice must every day be improv'd, as the society enlarges: If all this appear evident, as it certainly must, we may conclude, that 'tis utterly impossible for men to remain any considerable time in that savage condition, which precedes society; but that his very first state and situation may justly be esteem'd social. This, however, hinders not, but that philosophers may, if they please, extend their reasoning to the suppos'd state of nature; provided they allow it to be a mere philosophical fiction, which never had, and never cou'd have any reality. Human nature being compos'd of two principal parts, which are requisite in all its actions, the affections and understanding; 'tis certain, that the blind motions of the former, without the direction of the latter, incapacitate men for society: And it may be allow'd us to consider separately the effects, that result from the separate operations of these two component parts of the mind. The same liberty may be permitted to moral, which is allow'd to natural philosophers; and 'tis very usual with the latter to consider any motion as compounded and consisting of two parts separate from each other, tho' at the same time they acknowledge it to be in itself uncompounded and inseparable.

Who cites it

2 of 3 papers cite this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.

PaperCited asContext
Ainslie 1995(T 492)
T 3.2.2 (3 paragraphs)
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…; the interested "passion is much better satisfy'd by its restraint, than by its liberty" (T 492). When inconvenience…
Garral 2007(T 492)
T 3.2.2 (3 paragraphs)
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…he postulates a form of self-reflexive regulation - e.g., when avidity constrains avidity (T 492), or causal reasonin…
Spector 19983.2.2
T 3.2.2 (28 paragraphs)
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… 3.2.1 Book I's Conceptual Empiricism.............................................. 101 3.2.2 Bodily Continuity..…
3.2.2
T 3.2.2 (28 paragraphs)
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… ·Chapter Four discusses the developmental aspects of Hume's account of the passions. ## 3.2.2 Bodily Continuity …
3.2.2
T 3.2.2 (28 paragraphs)
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… into our passions and emotions; none of which can possibly represent a substance." ^See 3.2.2 note. Hume begins …
3.2.2
T 3.2.2 (28 paragraphs)
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… rather than experience. 73THN 1.4.1.12, p. 187. 74THN 1.4.2.1, p. 187. 75As we saw in 3.2.2, early signs of Hum…
3.2.2
T 3.2.2 (28 paragraphs)
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…nd-up, but in his account of bodily continuity, he does take a step away from atomism, as 3.2.2 showed. *Hume says…
3.2.2
T 3.2.2 (28 paragraphs)
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… in his struggle with the issue of personal identity with regard to thought. As we saw in 3.2.2, that question only…