T 3.2.1.9
SBN 479-80 · cited directly by 2 papers, reached by 2 more through page or section ranges
Now to apply all this to the present case; I suppose a person to have lent me a sum of money, on condition that it be restor'd in a few days; and also suppose, that after the expiration of the term agreed on, he demands the sum: I ask, What reason or motive have I to restore the money? It will, perhaps, be said, that my regard to justice, and abhorrence of villainy and knavery, are sufficient reasons for me, if I have the least grain of honesty, or sense of duty and obligation. And this answer, no doubt, is just and satisfactory to man in his civiliz'd state, and when train'd up according to a certain discipline and education. But in his rude and more natural condition, if you are pleas'd to call such a condition natural, this answer wou'd be rejected as perfectly |unintelligible and sophistical. For one in that situation wou'd immediately ask you, Wherein consists this honesty and justice, which you find in restoring a loan, and abstaining from the property of others? It does not surely lie in the external action. It must, therefore, be plac'd in the motive, from which the external action is deriv'd. This motive can never be a regard to the honesty of the action. For 'tis a plain fallacy to say, that a virtuous motive is requisite to render an action honest, and at the same time that a regard to the honesty is the motive of the action. We can never have a regard to the virtue of an action, unless the action be antecedently virtuous. No action can be virtuous, but so far as it proceeds from a virtuous motive. A virtuous motive, therefore, must precede the regard to the virtue; and 'tis impossible, that the virtuous motive and the regard to the virtue can be the same.
Who cites it
2 of 4 papers cite this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.
| Paper | Cited as | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Penelhum 1992 | (T 479) T 3.2.1 (3 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …nsures of other people. This is one account Hume gives of the origin of our sense of duty (T 479), thereby making con… |
| Garral 2007 | (T 479-83, 497) T 3.2.1.7 to T 3.2.2.22 (14 paragraphs) Citation pattern | … in doing so it may sometimes contradict individual self-interest and communal well-being (T 479-83, 497). But, at bottom, mo… |
| (T 479) T 3.2.1 (3 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ural" virtues of, say, humanity (qua benevolence), generosity (EPM 9.19) and gratefulness (T 479) as duties we are ob… | |
| Spector 1998 | 3.2.1 T 3.2.1 (19 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ly Signs of Methodological Trouble.................................................. 101 3.2.1 Book I's Conceptual… |
| 3.2.1 T 3.2.1 (19 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …xamination of the contents of the mind. ## 3.2 Early Signs of Methodological Trouble ## 3.2.1 Book I's Conceptual… | |
| 3.2.1 T 3.2.1 (19 paragraphs) Citation pattern | … op. cit.. However, McIntyre makes no distinction between memory and consciousness. ^See 3.2.1 for what Hume actua… | |
| 3.2.1 T 3.2.1 (19 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …orm a double relation of impressions and ideas, resulting in the passion of pride. 33See 3.2.1. 34THN 1.1.4.1, p.… | |
| 3.2.1 T 3.2.1 (19 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ns and ideas, resulting in the passion of pride. 33See 3.2.1. 34THN 1.1.4.1, p. 11. See 3.2.1 for a discussion of… | |
| Ainslie 2003 | T 3.2.1 T 3.2.1 (19 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …e thinks that natural virtues are spontaneously manifested in their possessor's behavior (T 3.2.1). The generous pers… |