T 3.1.2.11
SBN 475-6 · cited directly by 0 papers, reached by 1 more through page or section ranges
Thus we are still brought back to our first position, that virtue is distinguished by the pleasure, and vice by the pain, that any action, sentiment or character gives us by the mere view and contemplation. This decision is very commodious; because it reduces us to this simple question, Why any action or sentiment upon the general view or survey, gives a certain satisfaction or uneasiness, in order to shew the origin |of its moral rectitude or depravity, without looking for any incomprehensible relations and qualities, which never did exist in nature, nor even in our imagination, by any clear and distinct conception. I flatter myself I have executed a great part of my present design by a state of the question, which appears to me so free from ambiguity and obscurity.
Who cites it
0 of 1 paper cites this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.
| Paper | Cited as | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Ainslie 1999 | III.i.2 T 3.1.2 (12 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …. In the primary portions of the text where he presents his own view of moral evaluation, III.i.2 and III.iti, he use… |
| (T 471, 472, 475, 614, 617) T 3.1.2.2 to T 3.3.5.6 (12 paragraphs) Citation pattern | … 579, 58a, 587, 59 ~ 591, 598, 6o6, 618), "persons" (T 575, 581, 582, 584, 592), "acUons" (T 471, 472, 475, 614, 617). We can conc l ude… |