T 3.1.2.1
SBN 470 · cited directly by 0 papers, reached by 1 more through page or section ranges
THUS the course of the argument leads us to conclude, that since vice and virtue are not discoverable merely by reason, or the comparison of ideas, it must be by means of some impression or sentiment they occasion, that we are able to mark the difference betwixt them. Our decisions concerning moral rectitude and depravity are evidently perceptions; and as all perceptions are either impressions or ideas, the exclusion of the one is a convincing argument for the other. Morality, therefore, is more properly felt than judg'd of; tho' this feeling or sentiment is commonly so soft and gentle, that we are apt to confound it with an idea, according to our common custom of taking all things for the same, which have any near resemblance to each other.
Who cites it
0 of 1 paper cites this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.
| Paper | Cited as | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Ainslie 1999 | III.i.2 T 3.1.2 (12 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …. In the primary portions of the text where he presents his own view of moral evaluation, III.i.2 and III.iti, he use… |