Treatise Mapping
Map · Book 3: Of Morals · Part 1: Of Virtue and Vice in general · T 3.1.1 Moral Distinctions not deriv'd from Reason

T 3.1.1.5

SBN 457 · cited directly by 0 papers, reached by 1 more through page or section ranges

If morality had naturally no influence on human passions and actions, 'twere in vain to take such pains to inculcate it; and nothing wou'd be more fruitless than that multitude of rules and precepts, with which all moralists abound. Philosophy is commonly divided into speculative and practical; and as morality is always comprehended under the latter division, 'tis supposed to influence our passions and actions, and to go beyond the calm and indolent judgments of the understanding. And this is confirm'd by common experience, which informs us, that men are often govern'd by their duties, and are deter'd from some actions by the opinion of injustice, and impell'd to others by that of obligation.

Who cites it

0 of 1 paper cites this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.

PaperCited asContext
Ainslie 1999(T 457)
T 3.1.1 (5 paragraphs)
Citation pattern
…s direct. At any rate, Hume thinks that the moral sentiments are able to influence action (T 457), and thus they must…
III.i.1
T 3.1.1 (30 paragraphs)
Citation pattern
…uments about moral judgement in the Section "Moral distinctions not deriv'd from reason" (III.i.1) take on a new ligh…