Map · Book 3: Of Morals · Part 1: Of Virtue and Vice in general · T 3.1.1 Moral Distinctions not deriv'd from Reason
T 3.1.1.3
SBN 456 · cited directly by 1 paper, reached by 1 more through page or section ranges
Now as perceptions resolve themselves into two kinds, viz. impressions and ideas, this distinction gives rise to a question, with which we shall open up our present enquiry concerning morals, Whether 'tis by means of our ideas or impressions we distinguish betwixt vice and virtue, and pronounce an action blameable or praise-worthy? This will immediately cut off all loose discourses and declamations, and reduce us to something precise and exact on the present subject.
Who cites it
1 of 2 papers cite this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.
| Paper | Cited as | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Pitson 2013 | T 3.1.1.13, 3 T 3.1.1 (2 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ance (T 1.4.5.21, 1.4.5.23; SBN 243, 244), and the moral rationalists on virtue and vice (T 3.1.1.13, 3.1.1.15n68, 3.1.1.19… |
| Ainslie 1999 | III.i.1 T 3.1.1 (30 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …uments about moral judgement in the Section "Moral distinctions not deriv'd from reason" (III.i.1) take on a new ligh… |