T 3.1.1.19
SBN 463-4 · cited directly by 1 paper, reached by 1 more through page or section ranges
If you assert, that vice and virtue consist in relations susceptible of certainty and demonstration, you must confine yourself to those four relations, which alone admit of that degree of evidence; and in that case you run into absurdities, from which you will never be able to extricate yourself. For as you make the very essence of morality to lie in the |relations, and as there is no one of these relations but what is applicable, not only to an irrational, but also to an inanimate object; it follows, that even such objects must be susceptible of merit or demerit. Resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality, and proportions in quantity and number; all these relations belong as properly to matter, as to our actions, passions, and volitions. 'Tis unquestionable, therefore, that morality lies not in any of these relations, nor the sense of it in their discovery[69].
Who cites it
1 of 2 papers cite this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.
| Paper | Cited as | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Pitson 2013 | 3.1.1.19 this paragraph Citation pattern | …3; SBN 243, 244), and the moral rationalists on virtue and vice (T 3.1.1.13, 3.1.1.15n68, 3.1.1.19 (including note 69)… |
| Ainslie 1999 | III.i.1 T 3.1.1 (30 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …uments about moral judgement in the Section "Moral distinctions not deriv'd from reason" (III.i.1) take on a new ligh… |