T 3.1.1.13
SBN 460 · cited directly by 1 paper, reached by 1 more through page or section ranges
And here it may be proper to observe, that if moral distinctions be deriv'd from the truth or falshood of those judgments, they must take place wherever we form the judgments; nor will there be any difference, whether the question be concerning an apple or a kingdom, or whether the error be avoidable or unavoidable. For as the very essence of morality is suppos'd to consist in an agreement or disagreement to reason, the other circumstances are entirely arbitrary, and can never either bestow on any action the character of virtuous or vicious, or deprive it of that character. To which we may add, that this agreement or disagreement, not admitting of degrees, all virtues and vices wou'd of course be equal.
Who cites it
1 of 2 papers cite this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.
| Paper | Cited as | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Pitson 2013 | T 3.1.1.13, 3 T 3.1.1 (2 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ance (T 1.4.5.21, 1.4.5.23; SBN 243, 244), and the moral rationalists on virtue and vice (T 3.1.1.13, 3.1.1.15n68, 3.1.1.19… |
| Ainslie 1999 | III.i.1 T 3.1.1 (30 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …uments about moral judgement in the Section "Moral distinctions not deriv'd from reason" (III.i.1) take on a new ligh… |