T 2.3.3.5
SBN 415 · cited directly by 2 papers
A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification. When I am angry, I am actually possest with the passion, and in that emotion have no more a reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five foot high. 'Tis impossible, therefore, that this passion can be oppos'd by, or be contradictory to truth and reason; since this contradiction consists in the disagreement of ideas, consider'd as copies, with those objects, which they represent.
Who cites it
2 of 2 papers cite this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.
| Paper | Cited as | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Ainslie 1999 | II.iii.3 T 2.3.3 (10 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …reas the former , as a merely theoretical belief, can have no practical impor t for Hume (II.iii.3), the latter, as a … |
| (T 415) T 2.3.3 (3 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …lating Hume ' s doctrine that "reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions" (T 415). Note that it does… | |
| Cottrell 2015 | T 2.3.3.5 this paragraph Citation pattern | …tion. For example, the passions of pride and humility are not themselves representations (T 2.3.3.5; SBN 415) but nonet… |
| SBN 163, 415 T 1.3.14.16 to T 2.3.3.6 (6 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …. 48. For the role of copying in representation, see, for example, T 1.3.14.16, 2.3.3.5; SBN 163, 415. For the interchang… |