T 2.3.3.10
SBN 418 · cited directly by 1 paper, reached by 1 more through page or section ranges
The common error of metaphysicians has lain in ascribing the direction of the will entirely to one of these principles, and supposing the other to have no influence. Men often act knowingly against their interest: For which reason the view of the greatest possible good does not always influence them. Men often counter-act a violent passion in prosecution of their interests and designs: 'Tis not therefore the present uneasiness alone, which determines them. In general we may observe, that both these principles operate on the will; and where they are contrary, that either of them prevails, according to the general character or present disposition of the person. What we call strength of mind, implies the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent; tho' we may easily observe, there is no man so constantly possess'd of this virtue, as never on any occasion to yield to the sollicitations of passion and desire. From these variations of temper proceeds the great difficulty of deciding concerning the actions and resolutions of men, where there is any contrariety of motives and passions.
Who cites it
1 of 2 papers cite this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.
| Paper | Cited as | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Thiel 2011 | '.
(p.418) T 2.3.3.9 to T 2.3.4.1 (3 paragraphs) Checked by model | …re closely, however, to see what his own view is that he thinks is so 'peculiar to himself'. (p.418) 13.3. What is Hume'… |
| Ainslie 1999 | II.iii.3 T 2.3.3 (10 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …reas the former , as a merely theoretical belief, can have no practical impor t for Hume (II.iii.3), the latter, as a … |