T 2.3.3.1
SBN 413 · cited directly by 1 paper, reached by 1 more through page or section ranges
NOTHING is more usual in philosophy, and even in common life, than to talk of the combat of passion and reason, to give the preference to reason, and assert that men are only so far virtuous as they conform themselves to its dictates. Every rational creature, 'tis said, is oblig'd to regulate his actions by reason; and if any other motive or principle challenge the direction of his conduct, he ought to oppose it, 'till it be entirely subdu'd, or at least brought to a conformity with that superior principle. On this method of thinking the greatest part of moral philosophy, antient and modern, seems to be founded; nor is there an ampler field, as well for metaphysical arguments, as popular declamations, than this suppos'd pre-eminence of reason above passion. The eternity, invariableness, and divine origin of the former have been display'd to the best advantage: The blindness, unconstancy, and deceitfulness of the latter have been as strongly insisted on. In order to shew the fallacy of all this philosophy, I shall endeavour to prove first, that reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will; and secondly, that it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will.
Who cites it
1 of 2 papers cite this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.
| Paper | Cited as | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Henderson 1990 | (T 413) T 2.3.3 (2 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …rom demonstration or probability; [and] as it regards the abstract relations of our ideas (T 413). Reason then is una… |
| Ainslie 1999 | II.iii.3 T 2.3.3 (10 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …reas the former , as a merely theoretical belief, can have no practical impor t for Hume (II.iii.3), the latter, as a … |