T 2.3.1.18
SBN 407 · cited directly by 0 papers, reached by 2 more through page or section ranges
I dare be positive no one will ever endeavour to refute these reasonings otherwise than by altering my definitions, and assigning a different meaning to the terms of cause, and effect, and necessity, and liberty, and chance. According to my definitions, necessity makes an essential part of causation; and consequently liberty, by removing necessity, removes also causes, and is the very same thing with chance. As chance is commonly thought to imply a contradiction, and is at least directly contrary to experience, there are always the same arguments against liberty or free-will. If any one alters the definitions, I cannot pretend to argue with him, 'till I know the meaning he assigns to these terms.
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0 of 2 papers cite this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.
| Paper | Cited as | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Spector 1998 | 2.3.1 T 2.3.1 (18 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …Continuity of Agency Lies.............................................................69 2.3.1 Personality, Consci… |
| 2.3.1 T 2.3.1 (18 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …f law. This seems to support the reading of person/man as abstractions of some kind. (See 2.3.1 for more about this… | |
| 2.3.1 T 2.3.1 (18 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …n of personal identity. See Ayers, op. cit.. ## 2.3 Where Continuity o f Agency Lies ## 2.3.1 Personality, Consci… | |
| 2.3.1 T 2.3.1 (18 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …tise also indicates a significant evolution in his whole way of doing philosophy. l06See 2.3.1. ## CHAPTER THREE … | |
| Garrett 2010 | T 2.3.1 T 2.3.1 (18 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …es a similar style of argument in the section of the Treatise "Of liberty and necessity" (T 2.3.1), where he appears … |