T 2.1.2.6
SBN 279 · cited directly by 5 papers, reached by 5 more through page or section ranges
From the consideration of these causes, it appears necessary we shou'd make a new distinction in the causes of the passion, betwixt that quality, which operates, and the subject, on which it is plac'd. A man, for instance, is vain of a beautiful house, which belongs to him, or which he has himself built and contriv'd. Here the object of the passion is himself, and the cause is the beautiful house: Which cause again is sub-divided into two parts, viz. the quality, which operates upon the passion, and the subject, in which the quality inheres. The quality is the beauty, and the subject is the house, consider'd as his property or contrivance. Both these parts are essential, nor is the distinction vain and chimerical. Beauty, consider'd merely as such, unless plac'd upon something related to us, never produces any pride or vanity; and the strongest relation alone, without beauty, or something else in its place, has as little influence on that passion. Since, therefore, these two particulars are easily separated, and there is a necessity for their conjunction, in order to produce the passion, we ought to consider them as component parts of the cause; and infix in our minds an exact idea of this distinction.
Who cites it
5 of 10 papers cite this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.
| Paper | Cited as | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Henderson 1990 | (T 279) T 2.1.2 (2 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …uality of the thing is pleasant, then it is a source of pride; if it is painful, humility (T 279). At this point Hume… |
| Purviance 1997 | (T 279) T 2.1.2 (2 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …in experience that carry their object to consciousness with great frequency and intensity (T 279). The practical conc… |
| Spector 1998 | 2.1.2.6 this paragraph Citation pattern | … self and its relation to the network of thought, passion, and social interaction. 22THN 2.1.2.6, p. 279. Hume uses … |
| 2.1.2.6 this paragraph Citation pattern | …ntingent, but that the account he gives actually is one of a logical relationship. 30THN 2.1.2.6, p. 279. 31 Discus… | |
| Ainslie 1999 | (T 279) T 2.1.2 (2 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …leasing aspect of the cause, and the subject, the cause insofar as it bears the qual i ty (T 279). Thi s dist inct io… |
| Penelhum 2000 focused | T 2.i.2 T 2.1.2 (6 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …e and others, I do not see reason to retract these arguments. Hume introduces the self in T 2.i.2. 277. Pride and hum… |
| T 2. i. 2. 279 T 2.1.2 (2 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …atter of the exciting cause being a qual ity of myself as its subject. (See, for example, T 2. i. 2. 279: ' Beauty , conside… | |
| Ainslie 1995 | (T 279, 306, 352) T 2.1.2.5 to T 2.2.4.4 (8 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …sadvantages" (T 33O);25 our "country," also, is a frequent cause of the indirect passions (T 279, 306, 352). And since he takes… |
| Ainslie 2003 | T 2.1.2 T 2.1.2 (6 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …will not be available to serve as the object of the passions. I take Hume's definition at T 2.1.2 to indicate what go… |
| Carlson 2009 | T 2.1.2 T 2.1.2 (6 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …of related ideas and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness. (T 2.1.2. 2; SBN 277) Or, O… |
| Ware 2014 | 2.1.2-5 T 2.1.2.1 to T 2.1.5.11 (29 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ion of our mental operations, what he calls "reflection" or "internal sense" (Locke 1689: 2.1.2-5, 104-6). His distin… |
| Greco 2015 | T 2.1.2 T 2.1.2 (6 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …hip between this pleasure and our idea of our self, and finally the passion of pride (see T 2.1.2). All this, however… |