T 2.1.11.11
SBN 321 · cited directly by 0 papers, reached by 2 more through page or section ranges
Among these phænomena we may esteem it a very favourable one to our present purpose, that tho' fame in general be agreeable, yet we receive a much greater satisfaction from the approbation of those, whom we ourselves esteem and approve of, than of those, whom we hate and despise. In like manner we are principally mortify'd with the contempt of persons, upon whose judgment we set some value, and are, in a great measure, indifferent about the opinions of the rest of mankind. But if the mind received from any original instinct a desire of fame, and aversion to infamy, fame and infamy wou'd influence us without distinction; and every opinion, according as it were favourable or unfavourable, wou'd equally excite that desire or aversion. The judgment of a fool is the judgment of another person, as well as that of a wise man, and is only inferior in its influence on our own judgment.
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0 of 2 papers cite this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.
| Paper | Cited as | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Penelhum 1992 | Treatise 2.1.11 T 2.1.11 (21 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …g for my concern for others. This of course is true; but when Hume first introduces it in Treatise 2.1.11, he uses it as a "s… |
| Greco 2015 | T 2.1.11 T 2.1.11 (21 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ecome objects of each other's moral evaluations, thanks to the principle of sympathy (see T 2.1.11; T 3.3.2). In this … |