T 1.4.3.6
SBN 221-2 · cited directly by 2 papers, reached by 11 more through page or section ranges · rare passage
The peripatetic philosophy asserts the original matter to be perfectly homogeneous in all bodies, and considers fire, water, earth, and air, as of the very same substance; on account of their gradual revolutions and changes into each other. At the same time it assigns to each of these species of objects a distinct substantial form, which it supposes to be the source of all those different qualities they possess, and to be a new foundation of simplicity and identity to each particular species. All depends on our manner of viewing the objects. When we look along the insensible changes of bodies, we suppose all of them to be of the same substance |or essence. When we consider their sensible differences, we attribute to each of them a substantial and essential difference. And in order to indulge ourselves in both these ways of considering our objects, we suppose all bodies to have at once a substance and a substantial form.
Who cites it
2 of 13 papers cite this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.
| Paper | Cited as | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Swain 1991 | (T 221) T 1.4.3 (2 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …on of these qualities affect the mind in the same way that a perfectly simple object does (T 221). But when these qua… |
| (T 221) T 1.4.3 (2 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …are considered in a different light, each seems different, distinguishable, and separable (T 221). So we also conside… | |
| (T 221) T 1.4.3 (2 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …und object a title to be call'd one thing, notwithstanding its diversity and composition" (T 221). Hume gives the sam… | |
| (T 222) T 1.4.3 (4 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …nhesion are unintelligible or incomprehensible and may as well be called occult qualities (T 222). He makes the same … | |
| Humber 1995 focused | (Treatise, 221) T 1.4.3 (2 paragraphs) Citation pattern | … and other qualities, combin'd in a peach or melon, are con ceiv'd to form one thing.... (Treatise, 221) The emphasis on th… |
| Spector 1998 | 1.4.3 T 1.4.3 (11 paragraphs) Citation pattern | … Soul and immaterial substance,4! facing the problem of mental continuity head on. 39THN 1.4.3, pp. 219-225. ## 3… |
| Ainslie 1999 | I.iv.3 T 1.4.3 (11 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …source (and this not ion of a causal source is itself fictional Hume tells us [I.i.6; cf. I.iv.3] ). Wha t wou l d e… |
| Roth 2000 | I.iv.3 T 1.4.3 (11 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …2 See 'Of Scepticism with Regard to the Senses' (I.iv.2) and 'Of the Ancient Philosophy' (I.iv.3). 13 Even if you h… |
| I.iv.3 T 1.4.3 (11 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …18, my emphasis) In sum, Hume's discussion of object identity in the sections I.iv.2 and I.iv.3 of the Treatise is … | |
| I.iv.3 T 1.4.3 (11 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …supposed should have found their way into his earlier discussion of objects in I.iv.2 and I.iv.3. This new discussio… | |
| Ainslie 2003 | 1.4.3 T 1.4.3 (11 paragraphs) Citation pattern | … it goes to the heart of his explanation of our belief in external objects in T 1.4.2 and 1.4.3, and so he would no… |
| Flage 2004 | Treatise I.4.3 T 1.4.3 (11 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …es the parallels regarding belief in the simplicity and identity of material substance in Treatise I.4.3). Pitson writes: T… |
| Inukai 2007 focused | I.iv.3 T 1.4.3 (11 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …, resemblance) holding among them. In speaking of our identity ascription to an object in I.iv.3, Hume talks as if t… |
| Ainslie 2008 focused | T 1.4.3 T 1.4.3 (11 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ves no indication of an "I know not what" underlying the qualities (T 1.1.6.1-2; see also T 1.4.3). On the other hand… |
| 1.4.3 T 1.4.3 (11 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …nds of objects. He does not, however, return to the pre-modern substance theory (T 1.1.6; 1.4.3). Instead, objects … | |
| Kail 2008 | T 1.4.3 T 1.4.3 (11 paragraphs) Citation pattern | … substance is an application of Hume's general explanation of the concept of substance in T 1.4.3 'Of antient philoso… |
| Strawson 2011 | 1.4.3 T 1.4.3 (11 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …indthanjustaseriesofexperiences. There'sahelpfulstatementofthemoderatescepticalpositionin1.4.3oftheTrea tise.Moder… |
| Cottrell 2015 | SBN 221, 263 T 1.4.3.5 to T 1.4.7.1 (5 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …, "perfect") simplicity, Hume means the lack of "co-existent parts" (T 1.4.3.5, 1.4.6.22; SBN 221, 263). 11 For him, then,… |
| SBN 221, 253 -54 T 1.4.3.5 to T 1.4.6.6 n50 (6 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ted, we consider those things by a distinctive kind of mental action (T 1.4.3.5, 1.4.6.6; SBN 221, 253 -54). So, perhaps he ho… | |
| Rocknak 2019 | T 1.4.3.1-11 T 1.4.3 (11 paragraphs) Citation pattern | … of objects, namely, the ancient conception of objects ("Of the antient philosophy," i.e. T 1.4.3.1-11; SBN 219-225), the … |
| T 1.4.3-5 T 1.4.3.1 to T 1.4.5.31 n49 (69 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …losophers imagine immaterial soul-objects, ideas of objects are not based on impressions (T 1.4.3-5; SBN 219-251). For … | |
| 1.4.3 - 1 T 1.4.3 (11 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ion of the vulgar position is discussed in T 1.4.2.31-40; SBN 201-8 and intermittently in 1.4.3 - 1.4.6. 16 See (Rockn… |