T 1.4.3.4
SBN 220 · cited directly by 2 papers, reached by 9 more through page or section ranges
But when we alter our method of considering the succession, and instead of traceing it gradually thro' the successive points of time, survey at once any two distinct periods of its duration, and compare the different conditions of the successive qualities; in that case the variations, which were insensible when they arose gradually, do now appear of consequence, and seem entirely to destroy the identity. By this means there arises a kind of contrariety in our method of thinking, from the different points of view, in which we survey the object, and from the nearness or remoteness of those instants of time, which we compare together. When we gradually follow an object in its successive changes, the smooth progress of the thought makes us ascribe an identity to the succession; because 'tis by a similar act of the mind we consider an unchangeable object. When we compare its situation after a considerable change the progress of the thought is broke; and consequently we are presented with the idea of diversity: In order to reconcile which contradictions the imagination is apt to feign something unknown and invisible, which it supposes to continue the same under all these variations; and this unintelligible something it calls a substance, or original and first matter.
Who cites it
2 of 11 papers cite this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.
| Paper | Cited as | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Swain 1991 | (T 220) T 1.4.3 (2 paragraphs) Citation pattern | … will no more perceive the change, than if it contemplated the same unchangeable object" (T 220). We recognize the … |
| (T 220) T 1.4.3 (2 paragraphs) Citation pattern | … and this unintelligible something [is called] a substance, or original and first matter" (T 220). The modern metaph… | |
| Rocknak 2019 | T 1.4.3.1-11 T 1.4.3 (11 paragraphs) Citation pattern | … of objects, namely, the ancient conception of objects ("Of the antient philosophy," i.e. T 1.4.3.1-11; SBN 219-225), the … |
| T 1.4.3-5 T 1.4.3.1 to T 1.4.5.31 n49 (69 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …losophers imagine immaterial soul-objects, ideas of objects are not based on impressions (T 1.4.3-5; SBN 219-251). For … | |
| T 1.4.3.4 this paragraph Citation pattern | …substances" cannot be apprehended with our senses-they are, as Hume puts it, "invisible" (T 1.4.3.4; SBN 220). Similarl… | |
| 1.4.3 - 1 T 1.4.3 (11 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ion of the vulgar position is discussed in T 1.4.2.31-40; SBN 201-8 and intermittently in 1.4.3 - 1.4.6. 16 See (Rockn… | |
| Spector 1998 | 1.4.3 T 1.4.3 (11 paragraphs) Citation pattern | … Soul and immaterial substance,4! facing the problem of mental continuity head on. 39THN 1.4.3, pp. 219-225. ## 3… |
| Ainslie 1999 | I.iv.3 T 1.4.3 (11 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …source (and this not ion of a causal source is itself fictional Hume tells us [I.i.6; cf. I.iv.3] ). Wha t wou l d e… |
| Roth 2000 | I.iv.3 T 1.4.3 (11 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …2 See 'Of Scepticism with Regard to the Senses' (I.iv.2) and 'Of the Ancient Philosophy' (I.iv.3). 13 Even if you h… |
| I.iv.3 T 1.4.3 (11 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …18, my emphasis) In sum, Hume's discussion of object identity in the sections I.iv.2 and I.iv.3 of the Treatise is … | |
| I.iv.3 T 1.4.3 (11 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …supposed should have found their way into his earlier discussion of objects in I.iv.2 and I.iv.3. This new discussio… | |
| Ainslie 2003 | 1.4.3 T 1.4.3 (11 paragraphs) Citation pattern | … it goes to the heart of his explanation of our belief in external objects in T 1.4.2 and 1.4.3, and so he would no… |
| Flage 2004 | Treatise I.4.3 T 1.4.3 (11 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …es the parallels regarding belief in the simplicity and identity of material substance in Treatise I.4.3). Pitson writes: T… |
| Inukai 2007 focused | I.iv.3 T 1.4.3 (11 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …, resemblance) holding among them. In speaking of our identity ascription to an object in I.iv.3, Hume talks as if t… |
| Ainslie 2008 focused | T 1.4.3 T 1.4.3 (11 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ves no indication of an "I know not what" underlying the qualities (T 1.1.6.1-2; see also T 1.4.3). On the other hand… |
| 1.4.3 T 1.4.3 (11 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …nds of objects. He does not, however, return to the pre-modern substance theory (T 1.1.6; 1.4.3). Instead, objects … | |
| Kail 2008 | T 1.4.3 T 1.4.3 (11 paragraphs) Citation pattern | … substance is an application of Hume's general explanation of the concept of substance in T 1.4.3 'Of antient philoso… |
| Strawson 2011 | 1.4.3 T 1.4.3 (11 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …indthanjustaseriesofexperiences. There'sahelpfulstatementofthemoderatescepticalpositionin1.4.3oftheTrea tise.Moder… |