Treatise Mapping
Map · Book 1: Of the Understanding · Part 4: Of the Sceptical and other systems of philosophy · T 1.4.1 Of scepticism with regard to reason

T 1.4.1.12

SBN 186-7 · cited directly by 4 papers

This I take to be the true state of the question, and cannot approve of that expeditious way, which some take with the sceptics, to reject at once all their arguments without enquiry or examination. If the sceptical reasonings be strong, say they, 'tis a proof, that reason may have some force and authority: if weak, they can never be sufficient to invalidate all the conclusions of our understanding. This argument is not just; because the sceptical reasonings, were it possible for them to exist, and were they not destroy'd by their subtility, wou'd be successively both strong and weak, according to the successive dispositions of the mind. Reason first appears in possession of the throne, prescribing laws, and imposing maxims, with an absolute sway and authority. Her enemy, therefore, is oblig'd to take shelter under her protection, and by making use of rational arguments to prove the fallaciousness and imbecility of reason, produces, in a manner, a patent under her hand and seal. This patent has at first an authority, proportion'd to the present and |immediate authority of reason, from which it is deriv'd. But as it is suppos'd to be contradictory to reason, it gradually diminishes the force of that governing power, and its own at the same time; till at last they both vanish away into nothing, by a regular and just diminution. The sceptical and dogmatical reasons are of the same kind, tho' contrary in their operation and tendency; so that where the latter is strong, it has an enemy of equal force in the former to encounter; and as their forces were at first equal, they still continue so, as long as either of them subsists; nor does one of them lose any force in the contest, without taking as much from its antagonist. 'Tis happy, therefore, that nature breaks the force of all sceptical arguments in time, and keeps them from having any considerable influence on the understanding. Were we to trust entirely to their self-destruction, that can never take place, 'till they have first subverted all conviction, and have totally destroy'd human reason.

Who cites it

4 of 4 papers cite this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.

PaperCited asContext
Henderson 1990(T 187)
T 1.4.1.12 to T 1.4.2.2 (3 paragraphs)
Citation pattern
…vain to ask Whether there be body or noti, it is as vain to ask whether this body is mine (T 187). Unlike some relati…
Spector 19981.4.1.12
this paragraph
Citation pattern
…the source of the idea of the self must be the imagination rather than experience. 73THN 1.4.1.12, p. 187. 74THN 1.4…
Penelhum 2000
focused
T 1.iv. 2. 187
T 1.4.1.12 to T 1.4.2.2 (3 paragraphs)
Citation pattern
…e be body or not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings' (T 1.iv. 2. 187). He then tries to …
Pitson 2013T 1.4.1.12
this paragraph
Citation pattern
…re or instinct will always overcome any such tendency to radical and dogmatic skepticism (T 1.4.1.12; SBN 186-87). 17 N…