T 1.3.8.16
SBN 106 · cited directly by 3 papers, reached by 4 more through page or section ranges
Upon the same principles we need not be surpriz'd to hear of the remembrance of an idea; that is, of the idea of an idea, and of its force and vivacity superior to the loose conceptions of the imagination. In thinking of our past thoughts we not only delineate out the objects, of which we were thinking, but also conceive the action of the mind in the meditation, that certain je-ne-scai-quoi, of which 'tis impossible to give any definition or description, but which every one sufficiently understands. When the memory offers an idea of this, and represents it as past, 'tis easily conceiv'd how that idea may have more vigour and firmness, than when we think of a past thought, of which we have no remembrance.
Who cites it
3 of 7 papers cite this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.
| Paper | Cited as | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Ainslie 2003 | T 1.3.8.15-17 T 1.3.8 (3 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ence of a somewhat vivacious idea of an impression (i.e. of the seeing) of the Tower (see T 1.3.8.15-17, SBN 105-6). Hume c… |
| Ellis 2006 focused | T 1.3.8 T 1.3.8 (18 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …here is one passage that might appear to support the objection I have been discussing. In T 1.3.8, Hume writes: In t… |
| T 1.3.8.16 this paragraph Citation pattern | …ble to give any definition or description, but which every one sufficiently understands. (T 1.3.8.16; SBN 106) I think … | |
| T 1.3.8.16 this paragraph Citation pattern | …ent with Hume's claim in T 1.4.6 that we do not have an impression of the self.45 Thus in T 1.3.8.16 Hume must be thinki… | |
| T 1.3.8.16 this paragraph Citation pattern | …s precisely what the genetic explanation of T 1.4.6 is intended to explain. The appeal to T 1.3.8.16 would appear to pre… | |
| Ainslie 2008 focused | T 1.3.8 T 1.3.8 (18 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …d objects causes the mind to associate the idea of one object with the idea of the other (T 1.3.8). The scientists th… |
| T 1.3.8.16-17 T 1.3.8 (2 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …py of the original impression by being an idea of the event, not of the impression of it (T 1.3.8.16-17). Philosophers take… | |
| Green 1999 focused | (106) T 1.3.8.15 to T 1.3.9.1 (4 paragraphs) Checked by model | …s easily conceiv'd how that idea o s n mn a s n mn n which we have no remembrance. (106) I know many things… |
| ' (106) T 1.3.8.15 to T 1.3.9.1 (4 paragraphs) Checked by model | …nstead, he would have repeated his claim that memory reveals 'that certain je-ne-scai-quoi' (106) that marks an exper… | |
| Ainslie 2009 | T 1.3.8.15-17, 1 T 1.3.8 (4 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …hile introspecting with the vulgar's view of the world when immersed in mental processes (T 1.3.8.15-17, 1.4.6.5-15, SBN 105-6… |
| SBN 105-6,253-59 T 1.3.8.14 to T 1.4.6.16 (19 paragraphs) Citation pattern | … vulgar's view of the world when immersed in mental processes (T 1.3.8.15-17, 1.4.6.5-15, SBN 105-6,253-59). Moreover, he equa… | |
| Pitson 2012 | T 1.3.2-14 T 1.3.2.1 to T 1.3.14.25 n32 (218 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ning of certain key philosophical ideas (for example, space and time, T 1.2.3; causation, T 1.3.2-14; the mind, T 1.4.5.… |
| Pitson 2013 | T 1.3.2-14 T 1.3.2.1 to T 1.3.14.25 n32 (218 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …ain key philosophical ideas (for example, space and time (T 1.2.3; SBN 33-39), causation (T 1.3.2-14; SBN 73-172), the m… |