T 1.3.16.2
SBN 176 · cited directly by 0 papers, reached by 3 more through page or section ranges
We are conscious, that we ourselves, in adapting means to ends, are guided by reason and design, and that 'tis not ignorantly nor casually we perform those actions, which tend to self-preservation, to the obtaining pleasure, and avoiding pain. When therefore we see other creatures, in millions of instances, perform like actions, and direct them to like ends, all our principles of reason and probability carry us with an invincible force to believe the existence of a like cause. 'Tis needless in my opinion to illustrate this argument by the enumeration of particulars. The smallest attention will supply us with more than are requisite. The resemblance betwixt the actions of animals and those of men is so entire in this respect, that the very first action of the first animal we shall please to pitch on, will afford us an incontestable argument for the present doctrine.
Who cites it
0 of 3 papers cite this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.
| Paper | Cited as | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Loeb 1992 | 1.3.16 T 1.3.16 (9 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …me principles in much the same way" (p. 120). - 4.The remaining occurrence is at T 178 of 1.3.16, "Ofthe reason of a… |
| Garral 2007 | (T 150, 173-76) T 1.3.13.12 to T 1.3.16.3 (18 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …492), or causal reasoning distills rules or norms by which to judge of causes and effects (T 150, 173-76) - so here, in Hume,… |
| Rocknak 2019 | 1.3.16 T 1.3.16 (9 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …BN 92, 1.3.12.20; SBN 139), or as "reason" (T 1.3.8.12; SBN 103). In fact, he even titles 1.3.16, "of the reason of … |