Treatise Mapping
Map · Book 1: Of the Understanding · Part 2: Of the ideas of space and time · T 1.2.6 Of the idea of existence, and of external existence

T 1.2.6.3

SBN 66 · cited directly by 0 papers, reached by 5 more through page or section ranges · rare passage

As this dilemma is an evident consequence of the principle, that every idea arises from a similar impression, so our decision betwixt the propositions of the dilemma is no more doubtful. So far from there being any distinct impression, attending every impression and every idea, that I do not think there are any two distinct impressions, which are inseparably conjoin'd. Tho' certain sensations may at one time be united, we quickly find they admit of a separation, and may be presented apart. And thus, tho' every impression and idea we remember be consider'd as existent, the idea of existence is not deriv'd from any particular impression.

A rare passage. Cited by at most three papers, at least one of them focused on personal identity (ROBHOP). These are the passages a focused reader brought into the conversation that the literature otherwise passes by.

Who cites it

0 of 5 papers cite this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.

PaperCited asContext
Butchvarov 1959" (p. 66)
T 1.2.6 (4 paragraphs)
Quote matched to the Treatise
…object of our thought, or must be the very same with the idea of the perception or object " (p. 66). This statement of …
(p. 66)
T 1.2.6 (4 paragraphs)
Checked by model
…be questioned. In that section Hume clearly accepts the second alternative of the dilemma (p. 66), namely, that " the…
Robison 1974
focused
(T66)
T 1.2.6 (4 paragraphs)
Citation pattern
…e "there is no impression nor idea of any k i nd . . , that is not eonceiv'd as existent" (T66). But, "So far from …
(T66)
T 1.2.6 (4 paragraphs)
Citation pattern
…. I do not think there are any two distinct impressions, which are inseparably conjoin'd" (T66). Our idea of existe…
(T66-67)
T 1.2.6 (9 paragraphs)
Citation pattern
…of any object, makes no addition to it. Whatever we conceive, we conceive to be existent" (T66-67). Butchvarov conclud…
Penelhum 1992Treatise 1.2.6
T 1.2.6 (11 paragraphs)
Citation pattern
…lntyre, "Is Hume's Self Consistent?" in McGiIl Hume Studies (above, n. 4), 79-88. - 7.See Treatise 1.2.6. - 8.Nicholas Capal…
Pitson 2013SBN 64-67
T 1.2.5.25 to T 1.2.6.6 n13 (14 paragraphs)
Citation pattern
…attraction" but also, for example, volition as a source of bodily movements (EHU 7.10-15; SBN 64-67). It is also diffic…
Cottrell 2015SBN 66
T 1.2.6 (4 paragraphs)
Citation pattern
…epts a form of ideas"), and (iii) his claim that "consciousness never deceives" (E 7.13; SBN 66; see also T 1.4.2.7…