T 1.2.3.7
SBN 35 · cited directly by 0 papers, reached by 5 more through page or section ranges
As 'tis from the disposition of visible and tangible objects we receive the idea of space, so from the succession of ideas and impressions we form the idea of time, nor is it possible for time alone ever to make its appearance, or be taken notice of by the mind. A man in a sound sleep, or strongly occupy'd with one thought, is insensible of time; and according as his perceptions succeed each other with greater or less rapidity, the same duration appears longer or shorter to his imagination. It has been remark'd by a[8] great philosopher, that our perceptions have certain bounds in this particular, which are fix'd by the original nature and constitution of the mind, and beyond which no influence of external objects on the senses is ever able to hasten or retard our thought. If you wheel about a burning coal with rapidity, it will present to the senses an image of a circle of fire; nor will there seem to be any interval of time betwixt its revolutions; meerly because 'tis impossible for our perceptions to succeed each other with the same rapidity, that motion may be communicated to external objects. Wherever we have no successive perceptions, we have no notion of time, even tho' there be a real succession in the objects. From these phænomena, as well as from many others, we may conclude, that time cannot make its appearance to the mind, either alone, or attended with a steady unchangeable object, but is always discover'd by some perceivable succession of changeable objects.
Who cites it
0 of 5 papers cite this paragraph directly; the rest reach it through a page or section range. Snippets are the words around each citation.
| Paper | Cited as | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Loeb 1992 | 1.2.3 T 1.2.3 (19 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …tion is a consequence of Hume's views about change and time or duration.19 Hume writes in 1.2.3: I know there are … |
| Spector 1998 | 1.2.3 T 1.2.3 (19 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …..................................................................................... 11 1.2.3 The Case for a Tigh… |
| 1.2.3 T 1.2.3 (19 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …y indicates a radically revised philosophical approach to investigating human nature. ## 1.2.3 The Case for a Tigh… | |
| Thiel 2011 | I.ii.3 T 1.2.3 (19 paragraphs) Citation pattern | …seem puzzling. Hume explains this, however, in an earlier section of the Treatise (ibid., I.ii.3). Here he argues th… |
| Pitson 2012 | T 1.2.3 T 1.2.3 (19 paragraphs) Citation pattern | … elucidating the meaning of certain key philosophical ideas (for example, space and time, T 1.2.3; causation, T 1.3.2… |
| Pitson 2013 | T 1.2.3 T 1.2.3 (19 paragraphs) Citation pattern | … elucidating the meaning of certain key philosophical ideas (for example, space and time (T 1.2.3; SBN 33-39), causat… |